I am writing this on Halloween, the anniversary of the death of Harry Houdini. A celebrity for his daring escapes from apparently secure and inescapable places, he had commented during a public conversation on the strength of his stomach muscles, which he believed contributed to his famous abilities. Later, having heard the lecture, a student unexpectedly punched him in the stomach, rupturing his appendix which resulted in his death some days later from gangrene and peritonitis. He was just 52.

It is in the nature of a professional pilot to plan for the unexpected, to consider the unlikely and to protect, in so far as it is possible, from the consequences of very rare events. We brief before every departure for a rejected take off, despite it being rarer than "hen's teeth" - we brief on every landing for a go-around, despite this event being less common than sightings of the Loch Ness Monster! And professional pilots are always aware of the "nearest suitable airport", even though they know that if one engine fails on a modern jet transport, statistically the next one will run for more than seven years non-stop before it will give you any trouble...

It is this slightly obsessive attention to unlikely scenarios, and the fact that we are as a profession fastidious in ensuring regular training and checking of our standards and performance, that are major contributory factors to flying being the safest way to travel.

At ECA, we are often asking legislators and regulators to think beyond the obvious to the unintended consequences of the rules they create. Although we recognise the difficult politics surrounding, for example, the transfer of regulatory power from one body to another - nonetheless a single authoritative decision maker is necessary for regulations as difficult, complex and controversial as flight time, duty and rest limitations. Although the politics favours a shared responsibility, pilots know the unintended consequence of many centres of decision making "competing" for the correct decision will be a downward spiral of standards, reducing safety margins.

As the European Parliament and Council of Ministers consider the revision of regulation 1592 which we hope will transfer responsibility for operations and personnel licensing matters from National Aviation Authorities to EASA, ECA is asking them to consider the unintended consequences of allowing National Authorities to retain some decision making powers in competition with the European level regulator. ECA has long argued for a single authority for a single market. We believe that if clear responsibility is not created in a single authority, then somewhere down the airway there will need to be an explanation as to why a debate between a National Authority and EASA over who could regulate allowed an accident to happen!

The European Commission has publically stated its aim to increase safety in civil aviation 10 fold. ECA fully supports such a clear and laudable target. But we do not want to be party to the "stomach punch" of unclear lines of authority between EASA and the National Authorities leading to the "premature death" of the Commission's target.